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Abstract
The behaviour of the cryptocurrency market has often been characterized as a bubble in a vast
number of publications. Due to the lack of the fundamental value, or rather the intrinsic value
of cryptocurrencies, one can only apply several econometric methods to test for a bubble-like
behaviour with accordance to the price development. This paper makes use of a recently
developed econometric bubble method that relies on a unit root approach. Furthermore, the
growing number of studies on whether a contagion effect by a specific cryptocurrency lays in
another coin, is taken as a motivation in this study for the use of a bivariate Granger causality
test. An empirical application uses six cryptocurrency coins in which a general evidence of
a bubble is confirmed. It further concludes possible patterns to give a clue of such contagion
effects. The findings of this paper could motivate further studies of testing bubbles in the
cryptocurrency market with an augmentation of contagion market effects.
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The R code used in this paper can be found on Github 1
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1 Introduction
The attention by public media about cryptocurrencies has tremendously increased in recent
time (Li et al., 2018). For instance, Bitcoin, as the biggest cryptocurrency and pioneer in
crypto-coins, has experienced the recent major increase (by far the highest) of value from
917.17 USD in January 2017 to almost 20,000 USD (exact 19,205.11 USD) by December 18th
2017. This was an increase by over 2000%. However, shortly after the huge increase, Bitcoin
experienced a drop again below 6,000 USD, or in other words around 70% loss of value. This
drop happened in a time of only around a half year (peak December 18, 2017 to the low
from June 26, 2018). This spectacular market behaviour is not rare, as in the year 2013 the
market rose about 700%. This was the first big rise which was noted for Bitcoin.
After the recent explosive growth of the leading cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, the question be-
tween a currency and a financial product is still not clarified. (Jabotinsky, 2018)
Many debates about cryptocurrency‘s, in particular Bitcoins, intrinsic or fundamental value
came up. The comparison by Gronwald (2014) between gold and Bitcoin, concludes some
similarities with their complexity of mining them and the total supply (both limited). How-
ever, the problem still with cryptocurrencies is the lack of clearness by public media about
its fundamental value (intrinsic value) by its lack of use for physical applications. Whereas,
some people define the fundamental value of cryptocurrencies by their electricity costs to
mine the cryptocurrencies, others by users of the particular crypto network.Cheah and Fry
(2015) discussed in their paper that the fundamental price of Bitcoin is even by zero.
The question of whether cryptocurrencies are driven by speculative bubbles has been ex-
tensively debated in public media such as by Cheah and Fry (2015), Bianchetti et al. (2018),
Urquhart (2016), and Hafner (2018).Urquhart (2016) devoted himself to Bitcoin and its inef-
ficiency. He claims that it is used as an investment, or rather, as a speculative vehicle more
than for its main purpose of being used as a currency, especially with the enormous increase
of attention by public media and the increase of market capitalization within a short period
of time (5.5 billion USD to 605.8 billion USD) of three years (2015-2017).
Our study examined the question of whether a bubble is present in the crypto market. Due
to the lack of consensus about the fundamental value of cryptos, we have applied in our study
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several econometric tests to show the presence of a bubble within the crypto market. We
have followed a unit root approach in accordance with Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), Diba and
Grossman (1988) and Phillips et al. (2015). We showed the presence of unit roots within our
set of cryptos and further examined the presence of a bubble we were able to date-stamp.
Our study also provides an examination of whether a crypto in our set of cryptos show a
contagion effect by a specific crypto. We found out that with reference to a bivariate Granger
causality test, Ripple (XRP), gives a clue of such an effect on Bitcoin (BTC) as well as on
Stellar (XLM) and Litecoin (LTC).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background information
about cryptos and defines what a bubble is with reference to historical examples. Section 3
forms an overall terminology of time-series and explains what a unit root is. In addition, this
section forms a hypothesis on how to define possible driver within our set of cryptos. The
next section (4) describes the set of cryptos used in our study. Section 5 explains all our used
methods and the intention based on our overall hypothesis. In Section 6 we will apply the
tests on our set of cryptos and, finally, Section 7 concludes our findings and discusses them
for further study.
2
2 Background
2.1 Cryptocurrency Market
The word ‘crypto’ is Greek and stands for “hidden, secret” (Liddell and Scott, 1996). Ac-
cording to the origin and meaning of the word, ‘cryptography’ is the practice of encrypting
information. This practice is used within cryptocurrencies. In the following we will abbreviate
the word “cryptocurrency” with “crypto”.
Cryptos are digital assets with the intention of being used as a medium of exchange
(digital currency). They use cryptography to secure their transactions, control the creation
of additional crypto-coins, and thus to secure the transfer of assets. They were founded on
the incentive of being decentralized and global. This is a major difference with respect to the
characteristics of classical monetary assets (fiat money). Whereas fiat money is always backed
by a central government (e.g. the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank), cryptos,
by contrast, are founded on the principle of not being backed by any central government,
institution or bank (GAO, 2013).
The architecture of the crypto-coins are provided by a blockchain. Nakamoto explains in
his paper that Bitcoin (BTC) is used as a peer-to-peer technology for so-named “digital cash”
(Nakamoto, 2009). A blockchain is more or less a digital book in which each transaction is
secured from inception. Each transaction contains a time-stamp plus the transaction data in a
“digital block”. This generated block is then linked to its previous block (previous transaction
within the network). The special thing, compared to fiat money transactions through a bank
account, is that the blockchain is open for the public containing all transactions. So, every
transaction can be inspected. In this digital cash network, the address of the transaction
data is linked to a unique wallet address. However, it does not necessarily have to be linkable
to an individual person (containing their personal information). So, if person A pays person
B an amount of ω then only the wallet address is stored in the block without knowing which
individual person is behind it. Basically, the network communicates via address keys that
are linked to a person’s own digital wallet that stores all the crypto-coins.
Nevertheless, every transaction needs to be validated by the network so that, for instance,
sender A has enough coins in their wallet to send B the requested amount. This process is
called “mining”. Every user can participate and receives for the effort of going through the
validation process, a reward of new crypto-coins. This has another positive side effect as it
reduces transaction fees by creating this kind of incentive for the users to contribute to the
network.
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Among many positive aspects with respect to the technology and the fact of the decen-
tralization of cryptos, there arose many concerns by governments about whether they should
be regulated, and if so, how. Some countries, for instance, Russia or China, have already
prohibited the use of initial coin offering (ICO) (Jabotinsky, 2018). ICO is more or less a
method to call for raising capital through cryptos in exchange for a “token” created by the
fundraisers for their projects that is exclusively sold on the internet for which one can obtain
their services and/or products. In addition, over time one can participate in the growth of
the project by an increasing value of the “token” (Belleflamme et al., 2014). In short, ICO
refers to the inception of a crypto and is comparable to an IPO in stocks. When a company is
selling its stocks the first time publicly to interested investors, this is called an “initial public
offering” (IPO) (inception of a company’s stocks on a stock exchange).
In October 2008, the worlds leading first digital currency was launched with the name
“Bitcoin”. A pseudonymously named Satoshi Nakamoto introduced it. Beginning in 2009,
the Bitcoin software was being released as an open source code to the public on Sourceforge
(Cap, 2012).
From that point on, public attention grew and, thus, attracted a wave of people with a
touch to technology to devote themselves to this new topic. They tried to create alternative
cryptos based on the same fundamental technology, but with a specialized aim. (ElBahrawy
et al., 2017)
With regard to this fact, currently there are more than 1700 cryptos. However, in accor-
dance with the market cap, the top ten cryptos (BTC, ETH, XRP, Bitcoin Cash, EOS, XLM,
LTC, Cardano, IOTA, Tether) control about 84% of the total crypto market cap. What is
more, the top three cryptos (BTC, ETH and XRP) control 195.5 billion USD of market cap,
which is around 70% (Coinmarketcap.com, 2018).
To mention some specialized purposes, we now explain briefly ETH and XRP of the top
three cryptos (in terms of their market cap). BTC was already explained earlier. ETH
(Ethereum), as the second leading crypto, is a decentralized platform which uses smart con-
tracts (Ethereum.org, 2018). The reason for being in the top three cryptos lays in the
technology. With respect to the characteristics of the blockchain technology, smart contracts
make it possible to close contracts independent of third parties, e.g. notaries, but with guar-
anteed legal certainty. Additionally, with the use of smart contracts, it is possible to take
contracts automatically into effect under certain conditions (Bhargavan et al., 2016). The
third biggest crypto XRP (Ripple) is, according to Ripple.com (2018) , specialized as a digital
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asset for payments all around the world. With their well known RippleNet, they are able to
lower transaction costs and speed. Ripple works with an open-source technology, built on
the principles of blockchain to allow the traceability of transactions. Currently, banks and
payment providers are the target group, in contrast to ETH or BTC.
2.2 Financial Bubble
In bubble regimes assets experience explosive movements (Greenspan, 1996). Two types of
bubbles can be differentiated: Rational and irrational (behavioral) bubbles. Rational bubbles
are mainly driven by speculations that move the prices sharply without any proportional link
to its intrinsic value. Irrational bubbles are, in most cases, linked to any behavioral aspect.
Some of the behavioral aspects that move the asset sharply include herd instincts or any
other psychological factors (Phillips et al., 2011).
Many researchers have already contributed to debates about the existence of financial
bubbles and whether the bubbles were rational or irrational (behavioral). Some of the exam-
ples include Greenspan (1996), Shiller (2009), and so forth.
However, Greenspan (1996), with the phrase “irrational exuberance” on December 5,
1996, characterized a herding asset price behavior, and this explanation became the most-
quoted one in terms of describing a bubble regime.
By far the most famous and first recorded irrational bubble in history is the Dutch Tulip
Mania (1636-1637). Over a period of one year tulip prices skyrocketed in the Netherlands
to a price where a tulip bulb was equivalent to that of a three-story town house (Singh
and Zammit, 2010). Another example is the South Sea bubble in 1719-1721. Dale et al.
(2005) explain the bubble as one of the largest stock scams in history by the plan to privatize
the national debt of England. The shares of the company that was in charge of this scam
appreciated enormously based on behavioral aspects such as rumors, speculations and false
claims. Many people lost their life’s fortune by participating in the speculations of this
company. The more recent example of an irrational bubble is the dot-com bubble of 1997-
2001. With the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that provided a capital gain tax reduction from
28% to 20% (Dai et al., 2008), a major increase of capital flow towards major speculations and
investments arose. Everything with a “dot-com” at the end of the name had been bought
(Guttmann, 2009). The Federal Reserve reducing interest rates especially accelerated the
burst of the dot-com bubble (Wollscheid, 2012). Shiller (2009) describes this phenomenon as
a huge herding behavior that took place by retail investors as internet companies arose.
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However, looking back, neither the Tulip Mania nor the South Sea bubble provided any
positive side effect on the long-term to the economy, while the dot-com bubble, in contrast,
gave an impressive impulse to the diffusion of broadband connection and the revolution of
digitalization. The term “New Economy” (also known as Web 2.0) refers to the revolution
of internet-based companies, which revolutionized the traditional economy (OReilly, 2007).
So, overall, we could characterize two types of bubbles (rational vs. irrational) with two
different long-term side effects.
It is remarkable that all of our examples showed the same character of the course of a
bubble. The character of an irrational bubble driven by behavioral aspects was identical
throughout all three crises above. The evolution of the bubble and the final burst shows
similarities to the crypto market prices over the period of 2013-2014, or more recently, of
2015 up until today. The enormous hype of cryptos in the public media, especially in recent
times, has attracted more and more people to participate in the market. Whereas in the
beginning of 2015, the total market cap was about 5.4 billion USD, it rose over a period of
two years to 17.7 billion USD and exploded throughout 2017 to almost 606 billion USD in
market cap, with a current all-time high marked on January 8, 2018 at 830.5 billion USD,
and a sharp drop to 237.8 billion USD in less than six months (Coinmarketcap.com, 2018).
Overall, the current price movements in the crypto market driven by psychological factors
suggest there may as well be an irrational bubble.
However, as we summarized the general definition of a bubble with some examples in
history and a classification of the movements in the crypto market, we now need to identify
more precisely the presence of a bubble. Phillips et al. (2011) describe a bubble as when the
price of an asset exceeds the fundamental value (intrinsic value).
The current problem with cryptos, which has been discussed in the previous chapter, is
that there still is not any consensus about the fundamental (intrinsic) value as there is, for
example, in other assets such as stocks (Phillips et al., 2011). So, as it seems like there
is a consensus in academic literature about the possible presence of an irrational bubble in
the crypto market, it is nevertheless useful to apply econometric tests or formulate a model
that proves the bubble behavior while also taking into consideration the fact of the lack of
definition about the fundamental value within cryptos.
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3 Hypothesis
When analyzing time-series, we consider a sequence of measurements of our sample over a
certain time. Taking this fact into consideration, we know that the arrangement of our sam-
ple plays a role. So, in time-series a model is used where a variable y from our sample (in
our case the price of an asset) is measured in a period t (in our case day t for time). This
fact leads us to an autoregressive model (AR model). This model regresses our value yt from
previous values in our time-series, e.g. yt on yt−1, where t-1 denotes the previous period. The
number of values taken from the past to regress our model is called order. Thus, a model we
use is an autoregressive model of order p, which looks as following:
AR(p) : yt = c+
p∑
i=1
ρiyt−i + εt = c+ ρ1yt−1 + ρ2yt−2 + · · ·+ ρpyt−p + εt (1)
where yt is the price of an asset on day t, c some constant, ρ some variable and εt an error term
(white noise process iid ∼ N (0, σ2)). Noticing, an AR process seems familiar with respect to
a linear regression model. However, it auto-regresses our values y1, y2, . . . , yn (n=amount of
values in a data set) in which the arrangement of the yt is taken into consideration. One can
add to Equation 1 a time trend (βt). The characteristic of ρ, however, will play an important.
As mentioned above, the characteristics of an autoregressive model (AR(p)) manifest that
it only depends on the value that the variable took in the previous periods (order p) plus an
error term. The coefficient p implies the lag order.
For the explanation of ρ, we use the simplest form of an autoregressive process (Equation
1) of order 1, which looks as follows:
AR(1) : yt = c+ ρyt−1 + εt (2)
where yt is the price of an asset on day t, c some constant, ρ a variable and εt an error term
(white noise process iid ∼ N (0, σ2)).
The characteristic of ρ is important. This coefficient is often called root.
Supposing c = 0 and ρ = 0.4: If yt−1 = 50, then we expect the value to be 20 in yt
plus some randomness expressed by εt with the respected property above. In period yt+1, we
expect the value to be 8 and so forth (t + p). So, as the lag length increases, expressed by
p, the time-series will converge back to the value c (c = 0). This is called a stationary time
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series, where the time-series has a long term mean (variable c) to which it will converge by
time. On the other hand, when the given time-series has a root of an unit, i.e. ρ = 1, then
the time-series will not converge to its origin (variable c). Using the Equation 2 and setting
ρ = 1, one can see that by the same value as above (20 in yt), the series will never converge
back to c (=0). This leads to the characteristics and concept of unit roots, which is useful
in interpreting time-series. Given the examples above, with this characteristics it provides
insight whether a time-series will recover to its equilibrium price (variable c) as lag length
increases. If one can reject this case, then the process will be highly persistent. Furthermore,
then the process is hard to predict and control, in short it refers to a stochastic trend which
is often named a random walk. Visually, one can imagine a drunken man walking on a street
with moving to the right and left without any intention. The path of this person is unpre-
dictable to which direction he may move next. This refers to a time-series with a unit root as
well, in which e.g. prices will randomly move up and down without any stable path or rather
equilibrium price. According to the definition of a unit root, another important motivation of
it lays in an integrated process of order p. In other words, if a time-series has one unit root,
one need to integrate the time-series (e.g. AR(1) process) once (∆yt : yt − yt−1) in order to
remove the non-stationary out of our time-series to obtain a stable, invertible autoregressive
process, or rather an I(0) process. An integrated process is always denoted as I(p), where p
is the order or differences.
Furthermore, another condition of Equation 1 is, if the root ρ > 1 for certain sub peri-
ods in a time-series. Then the process notes an explosive autoregressive behavior. In other
words, the period yt has an accelerated impact on the previous period yt−1 plus an error
term.
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Figure 1: AR of different rhos (ρ).
As shown in Figure 1, a ρ > 1 in Equation 1 will have a significant impact on the overall
course of the time-series. Before the time-series shows this massive increase of price (with
respect to ρ > 1), we have more or less a random walk behavior with ρ = 1 (also shown
more detailed in Figure 1 in the bottom left). In other words, we have a unit root in which
the given time-series follows a stochastic trend. So, once the ρ in the AR process (Equation
1) turns to be greater than 1, the characteristic that yt only depends on the value that the
variable took in the previous period (yt−1),tempts now to an accelerating price move. Prices
are hard to predict and control. Furthermore, with ρ > 1 the shock of accelerating prices will
be highly persistent.
On the other hand, if the root is smaller than 1, i.e. ρ < 1, the time-series may look like
in the bottom right of Figure 1 in which the price always converges to its long-term mean.
In other words, the price fluctuates around the constant c out of Equation 1.
The property of Equation 1 that yt depends on yt−1 (plus the randomness) is often shown
by an autocorrelation function (ACF). This function shows how the ongoing values are cor-
related to yt. In a stationary time-series the AFC shows always the same autocorrelation in
particular lags, which can be interesting for forecasting matters. In contrast, in time-series
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of non-stationary, the ACF is only gradually decaying or not at all due to the characteristics
of AR process, and in particular the property of ρ, which has been explained earlier.
So, supposing it is known that an asset will increase the invested capital by buying in
the asset on day t and selling the asset for an expected profit the very next day (t+1), then
efficient speculation will drive up the current price of the asset. Without any doubt, no one
is going to hold an asset which increased in price and is then expected to depreciate over
a certain period of time. Therefore, a path of an asset can’t follow stationary. Therefore,
Fama (1970) explains with the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) that the behavior of asset
prices should follow a random walk. The same holds true for cryptos with accordance to
(Caporale et al., 2018). As explained, in a random walk model (with ρ = 1 in AR(1)) prices
will move now randomly up and down, which makes it impossible to forecast its path. In a
process where a time-series characterizes an explosive autoregressive behavior, the ρ is greater
than 1. Without any doubt, such a process in which prices move randomly and experience, in
some cases, an explosive autoregressive behavior (price shock) can only lay in a non-stationary
time-series in which a time-series has a time-dependent variance without any long-term mean.
These characteristics of a time-series explained above motivated Diba and Grossman (1988)
and Phillips et al. (2011), to examine the presence of a unit root in a time-series to conclude
whether price shocks could have a permanent effect on the series (non-stationary) or a tem-
porary effect (stationary). The presence of a unit root suggests that after a price shock the
series does not revert to its equilibrium price (long-term mean), or in other words its stable
path, which means that a shock is highly persistent. For that, they applied unit root tests.
Further, Phillips et al. (2011) uses a method for examining whether a bubble is present in a
time-series. In case of detecting a bubble, they are also able to date-stamp them.
We will test our set of cryptos for the presence of a unit root by applying the augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and KPSS test to conclude whether we have a bubble behavior (unit
root behavior) in the crypto market or not. Further, if we come to the conclusion that there
is a unit root, we will further test our set of cryptos for the presence of a bubble and then
date-stamp them.
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Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows:
• H0 = Our set of cryptos show no presence of a bubble with regard to a unit root
approach
• H1 = Our set of cryptos show the presence of a bubble with regard to a unit root
approach
Furthermore, Huynh et al. (2018) study tail dependence between BTC and XRP, BTC and
LTC, and XRP and LTC to test for contagion effect. In other words, they have found that
their tested cryptos depend on left-tail, which means that a decrease in price of BTC, for
instance, might lead to a loss for XRP and LTC. Ergo, the price effect on BTC causes all
their other tested cryptos (XRP, LTC) to follow. White (2015) describes BTC as the lion in
the crypto market. These studies motivate us to find out if a crypto coin in our set of cryptos
shows a contagion effect by a specific crypto coin. If so, this could be an important fact to
further examine bubbles in the crypto market. Further, a bubble examination in terms of a
crypto could then be traced back to a very few crypto coins.
Therefore, in our study we will try to find out whether there are any possible drivers within
our set of cryptos. For that we will apply a bivariate Granger causality test to test whether
any coin Granger-causes another. If so, we may be able to gain important information as
to the presence of a bubble, thus opening ways for further research. We will test our set of
cryptos on the following hypothesis:
• H0 = Certain cryptos within our set of cryptos show no clue of possible drivers with
regard to a bivariate Granger causality test
• H1 = Certain cryptos within our set of cryptos show clues of possible drivers with
regard to a bivariate Granger causality test
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4 Data
In the following study we will use six different cryptos, including the top three in terms of
market capitalization. We have chosen the other three cryptos for their amount of data size.
Each of these six markets are according to the data provider Coinmarketcap.com. Each data
point in our sample refers to the corresponding daily closing price (in USD per coin) for our
chosen time frame. Our data points for each crypto are structured in a chronological order
and, thus, form a time-series.
Mean St. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt Start Date Numb. Obs.
BTC 2033.04 3382.46 68.43 19497.40 2.36 8.35 04/28/2013 1921
LTC 29.64 55.51 1.16 358.34 2.74 10.73 04/28/2013 1921
ETH 211.16 292.17 0.43 1396.42 1.46 4.46 08/07/2015 1090
DASH 120.57 230.71 0.31 1550.85 2.65 10.80 02/14/2014 1629
XRP 0.15 0.35 0.00 3.38 4.20 26.95 08/04/2013 1823
XLM 50.18 92.29 0.22 469.20 2.17 7.06 05/21/2014 1532
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of our set of cryptos.
Table 1 gives an overview of the data of our study. All of the cryptos, excluding BTC, have
their start date corresponding to the date of the ICO. BTC, however, already launched on
January 3, 2009. The last day of the sample is July 31, 2018. In short, the cryptos from our
data set vary from 1090 to 1921 number of observations (days). Furthermore, all of our set
of cryptos use the blockchain technology.
A first look at the table already demonstrates the tremendous upside moves with respect
to an overall low amount of data points. BTC, for instance, moves last from 68.43 USD per
BTC (minimum price) up to 19,497.40 USD (maximum price). With respect to its standard
deviation of around 3,382.46 USD, it shows that high price fluctuations around the mean
price of 2,033.03 USD are possible. Also, the other cryptos in our set show characteristics of
high fluctuation prices around the given mean price. The lowest maximum price measured
in USD has XRP with 3.38 USD per XRP, whereas BTC notes, without any doubt, the
maximum price. A further description of our set of cryptos include skewness and kurtosis.
They provide details about the location and the variability of our given data set. With regard
to the kurtosis coefficients for our set of cryptos, they tend to have heavy tails. In other words,
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the coefficients, which are all positive, refer to a so-called “leptokurtic distribution with fat
tails”. XRP has the highest coefficient with around 26.95. This observation already gives a
clue that XRP has the greatest outliers (price fluctuation) compared to its mean price. The
lowest coefficient is with ETH, which has around 4.46.
Furthermore, taking a look at the measure of symmetry with accordance to the skewness
coefficient we already find an interesting observation. All of our set of cryptos are positively
skewed again, with XRP at the highest of around 4.20, and ETH at the lowest of around 1.46.
Therefore, our set of cryptos have overall no symmetry around the mean whereas the left and
right sides look the same. The fact of the positive skewness of all our samples shown in Table
1 already supports the fact that our set of cryptos, with respect to their daily closing price
(in USD), cant be normally distributed. Further study supported the fact, in which classical
normality tests such as the Shapiro-Wilk or Jarque-Bera reject normality at all conventional
significant levels (10%, 5%, 1%). For a visual comparison, it is appropriate to plot our set of
cryptos with regard to log prices, due to the fact that they vary massively in USD per coin
(from a few USD up to a couple thousand USD).
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Figure 2: Plot of our set of cryptos in log prices.
Figure 2 shows the log (natural logarithm) prices of all corresponding cryptos used for
our study.
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With respect to Figure 2 we can visually see an overall upwards trend in our sample of
crypto coins. What stands out is the fact that DASH, ETH, LTC, and XLM show visually an
equal path of log prices overall in our sample size. BTC shows, besides the higher log prices,
an overall equal path compared to the other coins, excluding XRP. XRP, on the other side
provides an interesting case. Whereas, the market more or less fluctuated around a visual
mean (log) price of around -5 over the path of three years, it then suddenly exploded by the
beginning of 2017 to around 0. Visually, XRP has the greatest sudden upward shift. Visual
inspection of Figure 2, supports the fact that XRP can obviously only be the market with
the highest skewness coefficient.
Figure 5 in the Appendix shows the ACF for all of our set of crypto for first visual
evaluation. The autocorrelation between the variable t and t − p (p=lag) only gradually
decays for all our cryptos. This gives a first signal of non-stationary for the time-series (set
of cryptos).
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5 Methods
In the following part, we will explain all statistical tests in detail with respect to their use
and interpretation for our study.
5.1 Bubble Testing
In accordance to Phillips et al. (2015), for the test for unit roots, we transform our set of
cryptos first into natural log data.
5.1.1 Testing for a unit root using the ADF and the KPSS test
Following the approach by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) and Diba and Grossman (1988) we start
our study by testing our time-series for the presence of a unit root.
The ADF Test:
The intuition behind the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (the ADF test) is the same as for
the Dickey-Fuller test, but with added lags to the model. Let us recapitulate once again the
Dickey-Fuller (DF) test and its intention for continuing with the augmented version of the
DF test, taking into consideration the DF test proposed by Hill et al. (2012).
If we subtract from an AR(1) process, referring to Equation (2), yt−1 in order to integrate it
in first order, we obtain the following:
∆yt = c+ δyt−1 + εt (3)
where ∆ denotes the difference operator (yt − yt−1) and δ = (ρ− 1).
According to the DF test, which is a left-tailed test, δ can’t be positive where:
• H0 : δ = 0 (equivalent to ρ = 1)
• H1 : δ < 0 (equivalent to ρ < 1)
For the estimation of δ , the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is applied.
If the test statistic from the DF test is smaller than its critical value (CV) (needs to be
smaller due to a left-tailed test), given from the DF table, we can reject the H0, that there
is a unit root in our time-series on the given significant level. Otherwise we cannot reject the
H0, that the time-series has a unit root.
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Note that there are three different versions of the DF test:
• ∆yt = δyt−1 + εt (no constant, no trend)
• ∆yt = c+ δyt−1 + εt (constant, no trend)
• ∆yt = c+ βt+ δyt−1 + εt (constant, trend)
Testing Equation (3) with regard to the DF test, we consequently refer to the second
version.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) works the same as the DF test but it adds lags to
the model to make it more robust (Hill et al. 2012) (Diba and Grossman, 1988). Compared
to the DF test where autocorrelation is present, the augmented version of the DF test tries
to reduce autocorrelation out of the model by using lag orders in order to test for a unit root.
Note that the same CVs are derived for the sample of the model as in the Dickey-Fuller test.
Now we augment Equation (3) by adding p− 1 lagged differences to our model:
∆yt = c+ δyt−1 + ρ1∆yt−1 + · · ·+ ρp−1∆yt−p+1 + εt (4)
where p denotes the lag order or the autoregressive process.
If the series is integrated in I(1) and we have a unit root in the time-series, then only the
lagged changes (yt−p, p : lag) contain relevant information in predicting the change in yt
(δyt−1 = 0). Again, the H0 in this case is rejected if δ < 0. If δ = 0, we cannot reject that
we have a differences stationary AR(p− 1) process. In other words, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of having a unit root in our AR(p) process and, thus, can conclude based on Diba
and Grossman (1988) that we have a bubble behavior in our series.
In case of the presence of a unit root derived by the ADF test, we want to verify it by
applying the KPSS test.
The KPSS Test:
The benefit of additionally using the KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) for detecting unit
roots is that its setup is interestingly different. Whereas the approach by Diba and Grossman
(1988) follows stationary under the H0, Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) follows stationary under
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the H0. In this case, we are testing our time-series from both sides for the presence of a unit
root. However, we need to remember that in only using the KPSS test alone, there is a high
rate of type I errors. This is a major disadvantage of the test. However, once combined with
the ADF test, the overall statement about a unit root can be more powerful (Wang, 2006).
Therefore, we will combine the ADF test with the KPSS test in our study for an increase of
the statistical power of testing whether our set of cryptos has a unit root.
The setup of the KPSS works by regressing yt on a constant and time trend. Taking into
consideration the KPSS test, it is also based on a linear regression model, but consists out of
three components: a random walk (rt), a deterministic time trend (βt, where β is an intercept
from the linear regression and t denotes the time index) and a stationary error ut.
In this setup our regression denotes:
yt = c+ βt+ (c+ rt) + ut (5)
where rt = (rt−1 + εt) with εt ∼ N (0, σ2) and the c serves as intercept for the initial value
r0.
Taking into consideration Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) and Shin and Schmidt (1992), the KPSS
test examines whether the variance of t is equal to zero (H0) or unequal to zero (H1). If the
variance of t is unequal to zero, then there is a random walk in yt. In that case we can reject
H0 that the series follows trend stationary. Note that the residuals of rt (t) are estimated
by the OLS method from Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Once we detect a unit root in our set
of cryptos we, nevertheless, cannot say if we have a bubble in our set of cryptos. The only
thing we can conclude is, if we detect a unit root process in our set of cryptos and ρ will turn
to be greater than 1, then we have a bubble. Therefore, Phillips et al. (2015) have created a
supremum ADF (SADF) test. With the use of the SADF test, we are able to test whether
our set of cryptos has a bubble.
5.1.2 Sup Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (SADF)
We follow the approach from Phillips et al. (2011). For the following we note the SADF test
as PWY test. The advantage of the PWY is the detection of a bubble in a time-series based
on a sequential right-tailed ADF test in which the diagnostic extends the sample sequence to
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a more flexible range. The PWY tests the H0 of a unit root (δ = 1) against the alternative
H1 of an explosive root (δ > 1). Phillips et al. (2011) describe the presence of an explosive
root within a time-series as a bubble.
Figure 3: Sample PWY test procedure
We will set our sample interval [0, 1]. As seen in Figure 3, the PWY sets r1 to 0 and
r2 [r0, 1]. It will use the initial window [0, r2] and varies r2. Further, the window width is
rw = r2.
Basically, the PWY starts in r1 = 0 with the ADF test for the first sample, which is
r1 + rw = r2 and then runs the ADF statistic on a forward expanding sample sequence.
The SADF statistic is written as:
SADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
{ADF r20 } (6)
where ADF r20 is the t-ratio for the OLS estimation of δ in the regression:
∆yt = c+ δyt−1 +
p∑
i=1
ρp∆yt−p+1 + εt (7)
The PWY test is a supremum statistic based on this forward recursive regression. In other
words, for the outcome of the SADF (r0) it will return the supremum of the δs estimated by
the OLS for our regression Equation 7 in a forward sequential method.
For the recursive unit root test (SADF) to detect a bubble, we calculate the CV by applying T
times the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation for M samples generated from a normal distribution.
For the CVs we will use the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Then we compare the
t-statistic out of the PWY with the respective CVs. If the t-statistic is above the CV, then
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we can reject the H0 of the PWY test in favor of an explosive root laying in our time-series.
In other words, we could speak of a bubble laying in our time-series (Phillips et al., 2011).
5.1.3 Backward test for date-stamping a bubble episode
Suppose our system detects a bubble, then we want to know when the bubble started and
when it collapsed. Phillips et al. (2011) feature that one advantage of the recursive types
of tests (eg. SADF) is that they allow us to pin-point the start and collapse of a bubble.
For that Phillips et al. (2011) and Phillips and Yu (2011) propose a backwards regression
technique, which identifies the points of start and collapse of a bubble.
Detection of a bubble:
The technique compares each element of the estimated ADFr2 sequence to the corre-
sponding right-tailed CVs of the standard ADF statistic received, out of the MC simulation,
for the identification of a bubble initiation at time Tr2.
For that, the estimated starting point of the bubble is the first chronological observation
(τˆe), the ADFr2 crosses the corresponding CV from below. The estimated termination point
is the first chronological observation after τˆe. It is denoted by τˆf . The ADFr2 now crosses
the CV from above. In short, the starting and ending of the explosive episode (bubble) is
noted as ˆτe/f = [n ˆre/f ] , where n is the total sample size with respect to the cryptos.
Formally, the dating of the start and collapse of the bubble is written as:
rˆe = inf
r2∈[r0,1]
{r2 : ADFr2 > CV adf (r2)}
rˆf = inf
r2∈[rˆe,1]
{r2 : ADFr2 < CV adf (r2)}
(8)
where CV adf (r2) is the CV of the ADFr2 statistic based on [nr2] observations (Phillips and
Yu, 2011). With the choice of Phillips et al. (2015), we use a minimum rolling window of
log(n), in order to remove small periods of explosiveness and date-stamp a bubble.
5.1.4 Time-series behavior under the hypothesis of a bubble - a summing up
To understand this process, we explain how the time-series behaves before the bubble origi-
nation, the actual bubble period, and after the bubble termination. We use the approach by
Phillips et al. (2011) and Phillips and Yu (2011).
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For detecting an explosive bubble behavior in our-time series, we will look at the following
equation:
yt = yt−1 q {t < τe}+ δnyt−1 q {τe ≤ t ≤ τf}+
+
( t∑
i=τf+1
εi + y
∗
τf
)
q {t > τf}+ εt q {t ≤ τf}
(9)
with δn = 1 +
v
nα , v > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) =⇒ δn > 1
where εt ∼ N (0, σ2), τe denotes the date of bubble starting and τf is the collapse date of the
explosive episode (bubble). q denotes an indicator function. Intuitively with accordance to
Phillips et al. (2011), if there is no explosive episode (bubble) in the time-series, then v = 0
and, therefore, δn = 1.
With regard to Equation (9), the time-series behaves as a random walk (unit root be-
havior) during the process before the bubble period starts (t < τe), then between [τe, τf ] it
switches to an AR(1) process with the coefficient δn. After τf , the process falls back to y
∗
τf
plus the sum of the error terms (εi) that occurred during the bubble period. According to
Phillips and Yu (2009), y∗τf is expressed by yτe + y
∗, with y∗ = Op(1). In short, the process
in (t > τf ) may relate to the earlier unit root process (t < τe), however, with some random
deviation.
5.2 Drivers Test Granger Causality Test
For the second approach in our study to examine whether a crypto in our set is having an
information gain in forecasting another crypto, we explain the Granger causality test with
respect to Granger (1969) and Mahdavi and Sohrabian (1991). However, first things first, we
need to explain the vector autoregressive (VAR) model, which is a prerequisite for applying
an Granger causality test.
Before we start with the VAR model we have to transform our set of cryptos into log
returns to be stationary.
Log − returns = yt
yt−1
= log(yt)− log(yt−1) (10)
where we use again the natural logarithm (log(y) = ln(y)). As we can see, log − returns are
simply the integration of log data in the first order (yt − yt−1).
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5.2.1 The VAR model
The VAR model, is one of the most used models in multivariate time-series analysis. It is
more or less a natural extension of the univariate AR(p) model to a dynamic multivariate
time-series. It is used for describing dynamic behavior of time-series, for forecasting, but also
for structural analysis.
Each considered equation for the VAR model is estimated using the OLS method.
The basic p-lag VAR(p) model consists of the following form:
V AR(p) = yt = c+A1yt−1 + · · ·+Apyt−p + εt (11)
where yt is a (n× 1) vector, Ai are (n× n) coefficient matrices and εt is a vector with white
noise (iid ∼ N (0, σ2)) and the same dimension as yt.
We only use a bivariate model, consisting, thus, out of two equations. Each equation rep-
resents a crypto. For instance, a bivariate VAR(2) model equation by equation, which intu-
itively consist out of two lags, has the following vector form:
V AR(2) =
y1t
y2t
 =
c1
c2
+
a111 a112
a121 a
1
22
y1t−1
y2t−1
+
+
a211 a212
a221 a
2
22
y1t−2
y2t−2
+
ε1t
ε2t
 (12)
or in equation notation:
y1t = c1 + a
1
11y1t−1 + a
1
12y2t−1 + a
2
11y1t−2 + a
2
12y2t−2 + ε1t
y2t = c2 + a
1
21y1t−1 + a
1
22y2t−1 + a
2
21y1t−2 + a
2
22y2t−2 + ε2t
(13)
with E(ε1t, ε2t) = 0 and E(ε1t ∗ ε2t) = 0, ergo expected residuals of zero and the error terms
are not auto correlated.
With this model equation, it allows us to make dynamic relationship interpretations
between the indicated variables, and thus, we can make use of the Granger causality test.
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5.2.2 Bivariate Granger causality test
With the VAR(p) model of lag p, the Granger causality test is performed.
Note, we need to clarify that Granger causality is not the result of a statistically causal-
ity statement in its power (Maziarz, 2015). The argument is much weaker. Nevertheless, we
can test the bivariate time-series, like whether y2 has any influence on y1 (a12 6= 0). If so, we
can say y2 Granger-causes y1, vice versa y1 Granger-causes y2, if y1 has any influence on y2
(a21 6= 0).
For our sample we have used the f-type Granger causality test. In this case, the vector of the
endogenous variables yt is split into two sub-vectors y1t and y2t with dimensions (n× 1). To
decide whether the additional information in the other time-series Granger-causes the other
(increases the R2), an f-test must be used to test the H0 of non-causality.
We will illustrate below how the Granger causality works on an example of a two-lagged
bivariate VAR(2) model. To test whether we can reject our null hypothesis, that y2 does not
Granger-causes y1, we will consider our Equation (13) in a rewritten way as the unrestricted
model:
y1tu = ct +
2∑
j=1
aj11y1t−j +
2∑
m=1
am12y2t−m + εt (14)
Out of our bivariate VAR(2) model (Equation 13), we receive all coefficients for Equation
(14).
In terms to assume that the coefficients for the lagged values of y2 are equal to zero (for
testing the H0), we additionally need to form the restricted model from our bivariate VAR(2)
model. It will have the following form:
y1tr = ct +
2∑
j=1
aj11y1t−j + εt (15)
Now the method will calculate the residual sum of squares for the restricted model (Equa-
tion 15) as well for the unrestricted model (Equation 14) by using the OLS method.
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The next step of the method is the calculation of the f-statistic, which is done as follows:
F =
RRSS − URSS
URSS
(
T − k
q
)
(16)
where RRSS is the residual sum of squares out of the restricted model, URSS is the resid-
ual sum of squares for the unrestricted model, T is the sample size, k the number of regressors
of the model and q is the number of restrictions to test (in our case of Equation (14), it’s two).
Once it has obtained the f-statistic from the Equation (16), it compares the value with the
f-critical value at the 5% significance level (5% is used our study). If the f-statistic is higher
than the f-critical value, we will reject the H0 and then we can say that the y2 Granger-causes
y1. In other words, the fit with the additional information out of y2 in y1 will be improved
(increase of the R2).
So, for instance, using crypto1 and crypto2. If crypto2 rejects the H0 of the bivariate Granger
causality test with regard to crypto1, we have a clue that crypto2 provides additional infor-
mation in forecasting crypto1.
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6 Data Analysis – Empirical Part
All of our set of cryptos are transformed first into natural log data to continue with the unit
root tests. We apply the KPSS together with the ADF test to our set of cryptos. Tables 6 to
10 in the Appendix report the main results. The KPSS states that on all possible significant
levels (10%, 5%, 1%), the H0 is being rejected and thus favors following non-stationary on
all our tested lags (up to lag 5). The ADF results on all possible significant levels (10%,
5%, 1%) with the use of all three types of ADF tests, that the H0 cannot be rejected of the
time-series (cryptos) follow non-stationary (on all tested lags). In other words, the first two
applied tests show strong evidence of a unit root laying in our set of cryptos. Continuing
with our study, we apply the PWY test to our set of cryptos (log prices) with one lag. We
implemented the test using the starting point r0, to the choice of Phillips et al. (2015) based
on a lower bound of 1% of the full interval of our data (r0 = 0.01 + 1.8/
√
n, where n is the
total sample size). For the calculation of the CVs, we applied 1000 times the MC simulation
for 1000 samples generated from a normal distribution. Table 2 reports the main results.
Test Stat 10% 5% 1%
BTC 4.35 1.14 1.43 2.10
LTC 4.62 1.24 1.45 2.00
ETH 1.21 1.25 1.55 2.21
DASH 0.41 1.28 1.57 2.02
XRP 1.97 1.22 1.46 2.11
XLM 1.59 1.24 1.50 1.94
Table 2: The SADF p-values with regard to the CVs.
The first column contains the obtained t-statistic from the PWY test. The next columns
give the obtained CVs. For each crypto we applied the MC simulations, with their respective
settings from above, separately. The CVs closely correspond to the values reported in Table 1
of Phillips et al. (2011). Given our results from the Table 2, we cannot reject the H0 of a unit
root in favor of having a explosive root (H1) in some cryptos out of our set. Since the PWY
test is a right-tailed test, the t-statistic needs to be bigger than the critical values obtained
from the MC simulations in order to reject the H0. Let us first compare the t-statistics from
the PWY test and the corresponding statement by Phillips et al. (2015) of having a bubble
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or not.
BTC and LTC show strong evidence of an explosive root, or rather a bubble in accordance to
Phillips et al. (2015), as they reject the null hypothesis on all given significance levels (10%,
5%, 1%). XRP and XRM reject the null hypothesis up to the 5% significance level. However,
on a 1% significance level they do not. ETH and DASH cannot reject the null hypothesis in
favor of having a bubble (explosive root).
The effect of having a bubble seems, therefore, strongest in BTC and LTC. For the visual
examination and a possible date-stamping of a bubble episode, we turn to the analysis of our
set of cryptos of the time-series of recursive ADF statistics to pin-point the start and collapse
of a bubble, as used in Phillips et al. (2011). The date-stamping algorithm was applied as it
was in Phillips et al. (2011), using a backwards regression technique. In short, the algorithm
is called BADF.
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Figure 4: Series of backwards ADF test statistics for BTC together with its respected CV
on a 5% significant level.
Figure 4 shows the series of ADF statistics for BTC together with the respected CV.
Note that we have used the CVs on a 5% significance level obtained by the ADF test for our
BADF algorithm (Phillips et al., 2011). Combined with a very short crossing beginning in
2014, there are two bubble periods observed. The first bubble starting on November 4, 2013,
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and collapsing on February 15, 2014, whereas the second bubbles origination is on August
14, 2017 and has shortly collapsed (May 30, 2018). In Figure 6 - 10, the series of the ADF
statistics are shown for the other cryptos in our set of data.
Overall, what stands out is that for almost all the sets of cryptos we can clearly conclude
explosive roots. For LTC the first explosive root (bubble) also notes beginning around 2014
and the second is observed recently with its origin around the end of 2017. XRP shows an
impressive explosive root (bubble) which already started in the first quarter of 2017. XRM
on the other hand shows the presence of an explosive root in mid-2016. Again, for ETH and
especially for DASH it is not clear whether we have an explosive root (bubble) with respect to
our econometric test. As visually seen for DASH in Figure 8, the series of ADF statistics only
vaguely exceeds the CV. Regarding Figure 7 for ETH, the series of ADF statistics tends to
fluctuate around the CV, which makes it difficult to give a clear statement. Nevertheless, we
can state that ETH shows as well evidence of several explosive behaviors within the market.
Further, our set of cryptos show a lowering ADF statistic in between their respected explosive
processes.
For our study to find potential interdependence, or rather drivers, within the set of cryp-
tos, we transformed our log data into log returns in order to get the unit root out of our data.
In other words we integrated the data once (I(1)) and formed a VAR(p) model of lag p. Our
findings for the bivariate Granger causality tests for the VAR(p) models of lag p = [1, 5] are
reported in Table 11 – 15. We firstly can conclude that possible patterns are only to report
up to lag 3. On lag 4 we see some shifts in these patterns. However, we included lag 4 and
even 5 as well in Table 14 and 15 to visually compare our findings.
We have to mention that we only seek the result in which the H0 (=Granger does not
cause) is present for one side, but for the other side we can reject the H0. With this result
we can better conclude in which direction an information gain can be reported. When we
have on both sides a rejection of the H0, we are not able to make any statement.
When taking into consideration these prerequisites, we can conclude some possible pat-
terns.
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Granger causality 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags
BTC-XRP 0.2934 0.3360 0.1785 0.0000
XRP-BTC 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3: p-values out of the Granger causality test between BTC and XRP on the tested
lags
For the bivariate Granger causality test between BTC and XRP, reported in the table
above (Table 3), we can find a pattern in which we can reject the H0, for XRP does not
Granger-cause BTC up to lag 3 (included). On the other side we cannot reject the H0 for
BTC Granger-cause XRP up to lag 3 (included).
Granger causality 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags
XRP-XLM 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
XLM-XRP 0.9509 0.1595 0.3922 0.0101
Table 4: p-values out of the Granger causality test between XRP and XLM on the tested
lags
Furthermore, we noticed another possible pattern between XRP and XLM, reported in
the table above (Table 4). For the bivariate Granger causality test, whether XRP does not
Granger-causes XLM, we can reject the H0 up to lag 3 (included) as well. On the other side,
with the bivariate Granger causality test, whether XLM does not Granger-causes XRP, we
cannot reject the H0 up to lag 3 (included).
Granger causality 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags
LTC-XRP 0.4124 0.4146 0.5188 0.0006
XRP-LTC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5: p-values out of the Granger causality test between LTC and XRP on the tested
lags
Last but not least, we can conclude another possible pattern between LTC and XRP,
reported in the table above (Table 4). For the bivariate Granger causality test, whether XRP
does not Granger-causes LTC, we can reject the H0 up to lag 3 (included) as well. On the
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other side, with the bivariate Granger causality test, whether LTC does not Granger-causes
XRP, we cannot reject the H0 up to lag 3 (included).
In other words, we can conclude from the bivariate Granger causality test, that we found
three interesting patterns. For predicting BTC, the additional information from XRP de-
creases the OLS estimates for the VAR model up to lag 3 and, thus, increases the R2 for
the VAR. Same for XLM and LTC, the additional information from XRP decreases the OLS
estimates and therefore increases the fit of the VARs (R2) up to lag 3, as well. However,
note that our findings do not give a clue about the percentage increase. The findings from
the bivariate Granger causality test literally report that the information from the additional
coin increase the fit (R2) and give us a clue as to an additional information gain from a crypto.
To summarize our findings in this study, the first results from our study show that our
chosen cryptos have an I(1) process. In other words, all our cryptos show strong evidence of
a unit root with accordance to the ADF and KPSS Test on all our tested lags and ADF-types
(no constant, no time trend; constant, no time trend; and constant, time trend). Even our
preferred ADF test with the inclusion of a constant and a time trend (referring to visual
inspection of Figure 2), cannot reject the H0 of having a unit root. Further study by apply-
ing the SADF test (with regard to lag 1) concludes that, at a 10% significance level there is
strong evidence of the presence of a speculative bubble in most of our cryptos. The strongest
evidence of a speculative bubble, even at the 1% significance level, with accordance to Phillips
et al. (2015) show for BTC and LTC. The date-stamping procedure allowed us to identify a
clear bubble in most of our cryptos. Interestingly, we were able to detect a bubble in XLM
at the end of the sample on July 31, 2018, which has not collapsed yet. Furthermore, our
findings for Granger causality state that XRP Granger-causes BTC, XLM and LTC (only
into these directions; not vice versa). The recently collapsed bubble in XRP for our sample
and the still not collapsed bubble in XLM are interesting. The recent media hype within XRP
and the henceforth bubble in this market show a potential information gain for the presence
of the bubble in XLM. Additionally, our study gives a possible clue that XRP provides an
information gain for BTC due to our Granger causality findings.
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7 Conclusions
We can conclude that the crypto market in general shows evidence of a bubble with accor-
dance to our applied econometric tests. Thus, we can reject our H0 of no bubble within our
set of cryptos.
Furthermore, the steps in our study show that the application of a size correction and im-
provement of the power of test with the use of the PWY test gives a more detailed picture of
the crypto market. The majority of our tested cryptos show strong evidence of a speculative
bubble. Moreover, in the Bitcoin (BTC) and Litecoin (LTC) cases, our date-stamping pro-
cedure in accordance with Phillips et al. (2011) and Phillips and Yu (2011) suggests strong
evidence of the presence of two bubbles. Ethereum (ETH), as the second biggest crypto coin
(in terms of market capitalization), suggests no presence of a speculative bubble on our con-
ventional significant levels. However, by applying the date-stamping procedure, it shows as
well evidence of several explosive behaviors within the market. With respect to this, one can
extend the PWY test with more lags. One can also apply information criterion to automati-
cally compute the lag size, e.g. the Akaike or Bayesian (Schwarz) information criterion. Due
to the lack of the fundamental value of cryptos we can only result our findings on one side with
accordance to the price development without taking into consideration the fundamental value.
Another important part of our study was the examination of whether our chosen coins have
any interdependence. With the application of the Granger causality test we came across
potential interesting patterns. With regard to our H0, we were able to reject the hypothesis
that our set of cryptos shows no clue of possible drivers. These patterns (of possible drivers),
especially with regard to bubble development could be an important consideration for further
study, in particular for bubble definition, timing and explanation within the crypto market.
More in-depth, we recommend examining these patterns in further studies with the applica-
tion of impulse response functions by shocking independent variables of the VAR model to
analyze the time response. In other words, to analyze the time response when shocking the
independent variables (e.g. of XRP) in the VAR (i.e. XLM). This could lead to interesting
findings. With respect to this, one can extend the VAR model for further input. We want
to mention that we found some interesting conclusions, which should not be neglected by
analyzing for potential bubbles in the crypto market as a whole.
Further, as Hafner (2018) has already studied and stated, the volatility of cryptos is time-
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varying, which points to another important consideration of examining bubbles within the
crypto market. In further examination, the consideration of time-varying volatility by Hafner
(2018) can also be implemented for our course of study.
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Figure 5: ACF for all our set of cryptos.
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Figure 6: Series of backwards ADF statistics for LTC together with its respected CV on a
5% significant level.
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Figure 7: Series of backwards ADF statistics for ETH together with its respected CV on a
5% significant level.
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Figure 8: Series of backwards ADF statistics for DASH together with its respected CV on
a 5% significant level.
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Figure 9: Series of backwards ADF statistics for XRP together with its respected CV on a
5% significant level.
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Figure 10: Series of backwards ADF statistics for XLM together with its respected CV on
a 5% significant level.
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B Tables
KPSS test results:
LAG 1 LAG 2 LAG 3 LAG 4 LAG 5
BTC 15.85 10.58 7.94 6.36 5.30
LTC 17.12 11.42 8.57 6.86 5.72
ETH 2.60 1.74 1.31 1.05 0.88
DASH 12.78 8.53 6.41 5.13 4.28
XRP 16.42 10.96 8.22 6.58 5.49
XLM 13.58 9.07 6.81 5.46 4.56
Table 6: The KPSS test results up to lag 5 with regard to its CVs (below):
KPSS CV:
10pct 5pct 1pct
critical values 0.12 0.15 0.22
Table 7: The KPSS critical values.
ADF with constant:
LAG 1 LAG 2 LAG 3 LAG 4 LAG 5
BTC 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.86
LTC 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.81
ETH 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.68 0.72
DASH 0.55 0.60 0.83 0.78 0.77
XRP 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.80
XLM 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Table 8: The ADF p-values with constant.
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ADF without constant:
LAG 1 LAG 2 LAG 3 LAG 4 LAG 5
BTC 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
LTC 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.77
ETH 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97
DASH 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.90
XRP 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19
XLM 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.84
Table 9: The ADF p-values without constant.
ADF constant and trend:
LAG 1 LAG 2 LAG 3 LAG 4 LAG 5
BTC 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.87
LTC 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.85
ETH 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.92
DASH 0.68 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76
XRP 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.77
XLM 0.42 0.30 0.21 0.28 0.27
Table 10: The ADF p-values with constant and trend.
Bivariate Granger causality test on 1 lag:
BTC LTC ETH DASH XRP XLM
BTC 0.0000 0.2514 0.2948 0.2934 0.0000
LTC 0.0000 0.2192 0.0479 0.4124 0.0004
ETH 0.0000 0.0001 0.9890 0.0018 0.0295
DASH 0.0000 0.5278 0.1938 0.0000 0.1439
XRP 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
XRM 0.0008 0.0365 0.2654 0.5133 0.9509
Table 11: p-values of the bivariate Granger causality test on lag 1
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Bivariate Granger causality test on 2 lags:
BTC LTC ETH DASH XRP XLM
BTC 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.3360 0.0000
LTC 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.4146 0.0000
ETH 0.0000 0.0001 0.6349 0.0025 0.0291
DASH 0.0000 0.0000 0.3831 0.0000 0.2533
XRP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
XRM 0.0030 0.0000 0.2750 0.0144 0.1595
Table 12: p-values of the bivariate Granger causality test on lag 2
Bivariate Granger causality test on 3 lags:
BTC LTC ETH DASH XRP XLM
BTC 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.1785 0.0000
LTC 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.5188 0.0000
ETH 0.0000 0.0000 0.0342 0.0027 0.0073
DASH 0.0000 0.0000 0.0659 0.0000 0.0001
XRP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
XRM 0.0104 0.0000 0.4608 0.0039 0.3922
Table 13: p-values of the bivariate Granger causality test on lag 3
Bivariate Granger causality test on 4 lags:
BTC LTC ETH DASH XRP XLM
BTC 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LTC 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000
ETH 0.0000 0.0000 0.0411 0.0032 0.0155
DASH 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
XRP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
XRM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0023 0.0101
Table 14: p-values of the bivariate Granger causality test on lag 4
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Bivariate Granger causality test on 5 lags:
BTC LTC ETH DASH XRP XLM
BTC 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LTC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
ETH 0.0000 0.0001 0.0338 0.0076 0.0207
DASH 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
XRP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
XRM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0013 0.0059
Table 15: p-values of the bivariate Granger causality test on lag 5
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